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LOAN-Zidanic v. Commissioner, 79

T.C. 651 (1982).
Over four decades ago, prepaid interest deductions inspired a tax
shelter game between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (the
Service). This game, refereed by the courts and Congress, continued
for some time. In the early years, the taxpayer was often victorious.
Recently, however, statutory changes and favorable court rulings
have helped the Service prevail. Now Congress, with the help of the
Tax Court, has effectively ended this variation of the tax shelter game.
In section 461(g) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 Congress severely restricted
prepaid interest deductions. The Tax Court first had occasion to
construe section 461(g) in Zidanic v. Commissioner.2 In that case the
3
court upheld this restriction.
Generally, a tax deduction is allowed for all interest on indebtedness paid or accrued within the taxable year. 4 The simple term "paid

I Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 208(A), 90 Stat. 1541 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 461 (1976)). That section states, in part:
(g) Prepaid Interest(1) In General-If the taxable income of the taxpayer is computed under the
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, interest paid by the
taxpayer which, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is properly
allocable to any period(A). with respect to which the interest represents a charge for the use or
forbearance of money, and
(B) which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid, shall be
charged to capital account and shall be treated as paid in the period to
which so allocable.
(2) Exception-This subsection shall not apply to points paid in respect of any
indebtedness incurred in connection with the purchase or improvement of,
and secured by, the principal residence of the taxpayer to the extent that,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such payment of points is an
established business practice in the area in which such indebtedness is incurred, and the amount of such payment does not exceed the amount
generally charged in such area.
2 79 T.C. 651 (1982).
Id. at 652-53.
I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983). Since there is no limitation stated in this
section, it does not matter whether the underlying obligation is a business or a personal one.
There are numerous exceptions to this general rule within the Internal Revenue Code (the Code),
however, such as § 264, restricting interest paid in connection with purchasing insurance policies
and § 265, restricting interest paid for funds used to purchase items producing tax exempt
income. For a discussion of the history of the interest deduction see Berger, Simple Interest and
Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 218 (1981).
380

1984]

NOTES

or accrued" has given rise to a variety of transactions involving prepaid interest. 5 These transactions, in turn, have precipitated both
litigation and congressional action. "Paid or accrued" refers to the
taxpayer's usual method of accounting. 6 The most common methods
of accounting are cash basis7 and accrual basis.' A taxpayer using cash
basis accounting usually will include an item as income in the tax year
in which it actually was received and deduct an expense for the year
in which it actually was paid. 9 A taxpayer using accrual basis accounting will include an item as income in the tax year in which it is earned
even if it has not been received and will deduct an expense when the
liability for it becomes fixed even if it has not been paid during the
taxable year in question.' 0
A taxpayer must choose one method of accounting, although it
may be a hybrid method, and must use that method consistently
unless the Commissioner gives permission for a change."I Code section
446(b) specifically requires, however, that the method chosen "clearly
reflect the income" of the taxpayer.' 2 The closer the income earned in

5 See generally Gabinet, The Interest Deduction: Several New Installments in a Continuing
Saga, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 36 (1970): Kanter, Interest Deduction: Use. Ruse, Refuse. 46
TAXES 794 (1968). Basically, these are transactions in which a large amount of interest, not vet
due, is paid before the end of the tax year to provide for an artificially large interest deduction to
offset an unusually large income item.
I I.R.C. § 446(a)(1) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983): see infra note 12 for the text of this
statute. A " 'method of accounting' includes not only the overall method of accounting of the
taxpayer but also the treatment given any item." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1981).
1 The cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting is one in which income items
are "included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received. Expenditures are
to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Id.
I The accrual method is one in which "income is to be included for the taxable year when
all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof
can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1981). Deductions
under this method are allowed "for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which
establish the fact of the liability giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy." Id.
6 See A. PARKER, E. KRADER, S. LEIMBERG & M. SATINSKY, J. STANLEY & R. KILCULLEN'S
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW § 461, at 8-23 (1983) [hereinafter cited as STANLEY & KILCULLEN].
10 Id. at 8-27.
1 I.R.C. § 446(e) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983). Cash method and accrual method are
the most commonly used accounting methods. Other methods include the installment method
and the hybrid method, which uses cash method for some items and accrual method for others.
See STANLEY & KILCULLEN, supra note 9, at 8-21.
12 I.R.C. § 446 (Vest 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983). That section states, in part:
(a) General rule.-Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books.
(b) Exception.-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
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a year is matched with the expenses incurred in earning that income,
the nearer the taxpayer comes to the "clear reflection of income"
standard, although absolute matching is not required. 13
Under the accrual accounting method, the taxpayer's ability to
derive a tax benefit from the timing of payments or receipt of income
is limited. This method defines when a payment will be treated as
having been made, or when income will be treated as having been
received, even if the money has not actually changed hands at that
time.' 4 Although the accrual accounting method more accurately
matches income with expenses, section 446(c)(1) specifically allows for
the use of the cash accounting method.15 Courts have upheld the use
of the cash method provided it does not materially distort annual
income, 16 and cash basis accounting continues to be supported because
of its simplicity, administrative convenience, and correlation with the
taxpayer's cash flow. 17 While cash basis accounting is an acceptable
method, its use by taxpayers seeking prepaid interest deductions has
led to much litigation.
Prepaid interest on indebtedness is deducted by an accrual basis
taxpayer as it accrues, ratably over the period of the loan.18 Prior to
1945, a taxpayer using cash basis accounting could deduct prepaid
interest in the taxable year in which it actually was paid.' 9 This
method, however, had a considerable effect upon taxpayers whose
income varied widely from year to year. In a year in which such a
taxpayer had an unusually large income item, and thus was subject to
an unusually large tax assessment, the taxpayer's tax liability could
have been lowered dramatically by deducting a large interest prepayment on existing indebtedness, thereby offsetting the large income
item. This practice of allowing a cash basis taxpayer to take a deduction for any prepaid interest in the year of payment gave the taxpayer
complete control over the timing of the deduction, encouraging signiftaxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary,
does clearly reflect income.
Id. (emphasis added).
'1 See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275 (1967) ("clear reflection"
requires as much accuracy as possible).
14 See supra note 8.
'5 I.R.C. § 446(c) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
16 See Simon v. Commissioner, 1947 T.C.M. (CCH)
47,009, at 40-47, af'd, 176 F.2d 230,
233 (2d Cir. 1949).
'" See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3439.
18 See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1981); Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76 (deduction
allowed only in period in which money is used and only to extent of interest costs for that
period).
19 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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icant distortion in the matching of income with the expenses incurred
in earning that income.2"
The success of taxpayers in finding ways to use prepaid interest as
a tax shelter led to gradually increasing restrictions on interest deductions for the cash basis taxpayer, 21 which culminated in the enactment
of section 461(g) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.22 This section
provides that cash basis taxpayers who prepay interest may not currently deduct any portion of the interest properly allocated to later tax
years. 23 Instead, the taxpayer must capitalize the prepaid interest and
deduct it as it accrues over the period of the loan.2 4 In Zidanic the Tax
Court upheld this rule, holding that the nonrefundable nature of an
interest prepayment does not remove it from the scope of section
25
461(g), and required the payment to be ratably allocated.
Joseph A. Zidanic, a cash basis, calendar year taxpayer, filed his
1977 Federal Income Tax Return with the Service in Cincinnati,
Ohio. 26 In April 1980 he received a notice of deficiency for the 1977
tax year in the amount of $47,560.27 Zidanic withheld payment and

20 See Kanter, supra note 5, at 798-801, for a discussion of the effect of this ability to control
timing. The tax advantage is most significant for a taxpayer with widely fluctuating income and
substantial borrowing power. Id. at 798. An example of an unsuccessful attempt to shelter
income in this manner is Resnik v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977) (four-year
interest prepayment made by partnership in existence for one day within tax year materially
distorted partnership income for that tax year). See also Fort Pitt Brewing Co. v. Commissioner,
210 F.2d 6, 9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954) (taxpayer should not have undue
control over timing of income or deductions).
21 See, e.g., infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWs 3439 (discussing development of
tax treatment of prepaid interest).
22 I.R.C. § 461(g) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
23 Id. For example, the interest on a loan extending from Dec. 27, 1982 to Dec. 27, 1983
would be only 5/365's deductible in 1982 and 360/365's deductible in 1983 (since those are the
respective number of days for which interest charges would have been paid for use of borrowed
funds in each of those years).
24 Id. Capitalization is "record[ing] an expenditure that may benefit a future period as an
asset rather than . . .treat[ing] the expenditure as an expense of the period of its occurrence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 191 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The interest is also subject to other limitations
in the Code such as § 163(d) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (limiting deductibility of
investment interest), §§ 704(d) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983) and 465 (West 1978 & Cum.
Supp. 1983) (limiting deductions to amount at risk), §§ 56 (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983) and
57(b)(1) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (minimum tax assessment), and § 189 (West 1978 &
Cum. Supp. 1983) (requiring capitalization of construction period interest).
25 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 655; see supra note 23 for example of ratable allocation.
21 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652.
27 Id. I.R.C. § 6212 (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983) authorizes the sending of a notice of
deficiency. Normally, before a notice of deficiency is sent, the following administrative process
occurs: After completion of an audit, a dispute between a Service auditor and a taxpayer
concerning a purported tax deficiency may be settled in a hearing before an appeals officer of the
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brought suit in the Tax Court.2 8
The dispute concerned a building which Zidanic had purchased
in 1977, using a non-recourse purchase money mortgage. 29 The
lender, Third Federal Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland
(Third Federal), was also the owner and sole occupant of the partially
completed building. 30 No down payment was required; the loan principal was due in a lump sum one year after the closing date of the
sale. 3' The purchase agreement, however, did require Zidanic to pay
one year's interest on the loan at the closing of the sale. 32 When the
sale was closed on October 18, 1977, Zidanic paid $92,375.33 to Third
Federal, which treated the amount as income in that month. 33 Zidanic was not personally liable for the loan, and was not required to
retain ownership of the building for the one year loan term . 34 Even if
he sold the building within the year and paid off the loan, however,
he was not entitled to any pro rata refund of the prepaid interest. 35
Regional Commissioner's office. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1141, 114142 (1980). If no settlement is reached in this administrative appeal, a notice of deficiency is sent
to the taxpayer pursuant to Code § 6212. Id. Although the Zidanic decision did not outline this
procedure it is presumed that these steps occurred.
28 See supra note 27. Upon receiving a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer may pay the
disputed amount and sue for a refund in district court or the Court of Claims, or he may
withhold payment and take the matter to Tax Court. See B. Bi'TKER & L. STONE, supra note 27,
at 1141.
29 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652. The original asking price was $1,500,000 and the final sale price
was $1,150,000, with the mortgage for this full amount. A purchase money mortgage is defined
as "[a] mortgage or security device taken back to secure the performance of an obligation
incurred in the purchase of the property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
10 Petitioner's brief at 2, Zidanic, 79 T.C. 651. The real estate in question was a five story
office building in which 20-25% of the space was finished and occupied by Third Federal. Id.
"1 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652. Petitoner's brief indicates that, since there was no down payment, Third Federal requested the prepaid interest as a security device. Petitioner's brief at 3,
Zidanic, 79 T.C. 651. But see Lewis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 625 (1975) (nonrefundable
portion of prepaid interest payment treated as prepayment penalty and deductible as interest);
Lawler v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1935) (prepayment treated as option).
'2 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652. Prior to the enactment of § 4 6 1(g), prepaid interest for not more
than 12 months after the end of the tax year in which the payment was made would have been
subject to a case by case analysis to determine its deductibility. See infra note 65.
33 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652. Some reasons a seller may accept or encourage prepaid interest
(ordinary income) rather than a higher sale price (capital gain) include the need to offset losses,
the fact that the property sold may not have been held long enough to qualify for capital gain
treatment, or the position of the seller as a tax exempt organization. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th
Cong. (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws 3439; see also Asimow, Principle
and PrepaidInterest, 16 UCLA L. REV. 36, 42 (1969) (comprehensive examination of history and
uses of prepaid interest deductions); Kanter, supra note 5, at 814.
34 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 653.
35 Id. The question of refundability of prepaid interest has been important in several cases.
See, e.g., Sandor v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1976) (fully refundable prepaid
interest treated as nondeductible deposit); Lewis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 620 (1975) (nonrefundable prepaid interest payment deductible).
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Zidanic contended that the full amount of the interest paid should be
deducted in the year of payment because of its nonrefundable nature.36 The Service argued that the taxpayer should have allocated the
payment between the two tax years involved, pursuant to section
461(g), and the Tax Court upheld the Service's position.3 7
Deductions for interest payments have been authorized by Congress throughout the history of the federal income tax. 3 Interest is
defined most commonly as "compensation for the use or forbearance
of money." 3 9 An interest deduction was first mentioned specifically in
1864.40 By 1870 the deduction was limited by the requirements that
the interest not be accrued and that any nonbusiness-related interest
be offset against and limited to the amount of the taxpayer's interest
income. 4 ' Code revisions in 1894 authorized interest deductions for
both corporate and individual taxpayers, whether the interest was
42
paid during the tax year or accrued.
The present Code states that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." 43 In 1939 the Board of Tax Appeals, 44 in the leading case of
Fackler v. Commissioner,45 interpreted similar language as allowing
the current deduction of prepaid interest by a cash basis taxpayer. In
Fackler, more than $8,300 of a $46,900 interest payment was attributable to a later tax year. 46 The payment clearly had a business purpose:
it transformed a demand note into a "time note which could not be
called during the time for which the interest was prepaid." 47 In
Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 654.
Id. at 655; see supra note 1 for text of Code § 461(g).
31 See Berger, supra note 4 (thorough history of interest deduction). A provision allowing for
the deduction of "'all interest paid or accrued on indebtedness" was adopted in 1918, and
identical language appears in the current Code. Compare Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §
214(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) with I.RC. § 163(a) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965) (quoting Deputy v. duPont,
308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940)); see Kanter, supra note 5, at 804-08, for a discussion of other possible
characterizations of payments ostensibly defined as "interest," such as options, deposits, or down
payments; see also La Croix v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 471 (1974) (payment held to be deposit
rather than interest).
4o See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223 (amended by Act of March 3, 1865,
ch. 78, § 1. 13 Stat. 469) ('[W]hen any person ... pays interest upon any actual incumbrance
...the amount actually paid for .. .interest shall be deducted.").
41 See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 9, 16 Stat. 256 (repealed 1872) ("[T]here shall be
deducted from the ... income of any person ... the amount of interest paid during the year.").
42 See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 394, 28 Stat. 509 (repealed 1895) ("In computing incomes ...
shall be deducted ... all interest due or paid within the year ... on existing indebtedness."); see
also Berger, supra note 4, at 219-20.
43 I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1978 & Cur. Supp. 1983).
11 Prior to 1942 the Tax Court was known as the Board of Tax Appeals.
45 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acq., 1939-1 C.B. 11, acq. withdrawn, 1968-2 C.B. 76.
3

37

3"

46

Id.

47

Id.
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addition, it reduced interest on the indebtedness from five percent to
three percent. 48 The court based its approval of the deduction on two
factors. First, a deduction for an actual payment of a deductible
expense by a cash basis taxpayer must be allowed in the year paid
unless the cash basis accounting method does not clearly reflect income. A deduction for postpaid interest would be allowed in the year
paid, and prepaid interest does not distort income any more than
postpaid interest. Therefore, the deduction for prepaid interest should
also be allowed. 49 Moreover, disallowing a current deduction for
prepaid interest would place a cash basis taxpayer on an accrual basis
for only that item, but hybrid accounting systems were not permitted
in 1939.50
The Commissioner argued in Fackler that the Code required the
taxpayer's method of accounting to reflect income clearly, that the
current deduction of a prepaid interest expense by a cash basis taxpayer distorted income, and that the Code therefore authorized the
Commissioner to require a change in accounting methods as to that
item. 5 1 Four years later, in Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner,52 the
court was presented with the same issue. In both cases the court
rejected the argument and allowed the deduction. The Service acquiesced in the court's allowance of a current deduction for prepaid
interest by a cash basis taxpayer, but limited the deduction to a five
53
year prepayment by issuing Income Tax Ruling 3740 in 1945.

41

Id. at 396.

19 Id. at 398.

50 Id. at 399. At that time, the accounting method had to be either cash or accrual; no
hybrids were allowed. Code § 446(c) now expressly permits hybridization:
(c) Permissible methods.-subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b), a
taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of
accounting(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) An accrual method;
(3) Any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) Any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
I.R.C. § 446(c) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
51 Fackler, 39 B.T.A. at 398-99.
52 2 T.C. 531 (1943), acq., 1943 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn, 1968-2 C.B. 76.
I.T. 3740, 1945 C.B. 109 (1945). The Ruling states in part:
It is held that where a taxpayer keeps books of account and files Federal income tax
returns on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, interest paid in advance for a
period of five years constitutes an allowable deduction for Federal income tax
purposes for the year in which paid.
.3
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Despite the apparent simplicity of Income Tax Ruling 3740,
litigation continued as taxpayers explored its limits.

54

The "Living-

stone" cases, named after the promoter of the artificial indebtedness
scheme involved therein, articulated the requirement that the indebtedness underlying the interest deduction be an actual indebtedness,
not just a "sham" paper transaction in which no indebtedness actually
occurred. 5 5 Goldstein v. Commissioner,56 as well as its companion
5
cases, Ippolito v. Commissioner57 and Barnett v. Commissioner,
emphasized the requirement of an economic purpose in incurring the
indebtedness apart from obtaining an interest deduction. In all three
cases the taxpayers had incurred indebtedness specifically to obtain a
prepaid interest deduction with which to offset a large award of prize
money received in that year, and in each case the Court of Appeals for
59
the Second Circuit disallowed the interest deduction.
While invalidating these deductions, the court seemed to reaffirm the deductibility of prepaid interest by the cash basis taxpayer in
the year of payment, as long as the loan transaction was not a "sham,"
and had some economic purpose other than obtaining the interest
deduction.6 0 The availability of this deduction led to a dramatic expansion of its use in real estate transactions. 6 ' In his article "Principle
and Prepaid Interest," '6 2 Professor Asimow extensively discussed the
tremendous impact of this deduction on the real estate industry in
Southern California in the 1960's. A high income taxpayer could easily
and openly purchase property in a transaction specifically designed to

54 See Cabinet, supra note 5 (discussion of progression of cases leading to withdrawal of IT,
3740, 1945 C.B. 109 (1945)); Kanter, supra note 5.
5 See, e.g., Goodstein v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), af'd, 267 F.2d 127 (lst Cir.
1959). Livingstone conceived of a scheme in which a loan was purportedly made to Goodstein
for the purchase of $10,000,000 of U.S. Treasury notes, but no money other than a $15,000 down
payment changed hands. Id. at 1179-80. The notes were bought and resold within an hour and
the remainder of the transaction consisted of "paper shuffling" to make the transaction appear
more substantial. Id. at 1179-88. The Tax Court denied Goodstein's deduction of prepaid
interest on the illusory $10,000,000 loan. Id. at 1190.
" 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (not sham transaction, but no -purposive activity" in incurring indebtedness other than tax deduction), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
364 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1966) (interest deduction disallowed for Dec. 23rd loan repaid 25
days later), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (interest deduction disallowed for Dec. 20th loan
repaid on Jan. 20th).
51 See Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 736-37; Ippolito, 364 F.2d at 743; Barnett, 364 F.2d at 745-46.
60 Id.
6, See Kanter, supra note 5, at 813-18.
12 See Asimow, supra note 33.
-1
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give rise to a prepaid interest deduction."3 In a typical transaction, a
taxpayer purchased property with no down payment, but prepaid
interest for five years. No principal payments were due until the sixth
year, after which the taxpayer agreed to make principal and interest
payments yearly until the tenth year, during which a balloon payment
was due. By the time a payment on principal was due, the taxpayer
very likely could sell the appreciated property and obtain a capital
64
gain while limiting both his cash outlay and his risk of economic loss.
In response to this expanded use of prepaid interest as a tax
shelter, the Commissioner in 1968 withdrew Income Tax Ruling 3740
and issued Revenue Ruling 68-643.65 This Ruling provided for a presumption of material distortion of income for interest prepaid for a
period of more than twelve months after the end of the tax year in
which the payment was made. 6 Payments for less than twelve months
might be deductible, but such determinations were to be made on a
case by case basis. Prepaid interest deductions not currently deductible under Revenue Ruling
68-643 were required to be accrued over
67
loan.
the
of
period
the
6 that the ComThe Tax Court held in Sandor v. Commissioner"
missioner had the authority under section 446(b) to adjust accounting

"IAdvertisements for the sale of real estate featured the availability of prepaid interest terms
as part of the transaction. A large percentage of land sales, especially in California, were of this
nature. Id. at 37-38.
64 Id. at 37-41.
65 Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, 77 states, in part:
A deduction for interest paid in advance [by a cash basis taxpayer] on each indebtedness for a period not in excess of 12 months of the taxable year immediately following
the taxable year in which the prepayment is made will be considered on a case by
case basis to determine whether a material distortion of income has resulted . . . . If
interest is prepaid for a period extending more than 12 months beyond thc end of the
current taxable year, the deduction of such prepaid interest in the taxable year of
payment will be considered as materially distorting income. Where a material
distortion of income has been found . . . the Service will require the taxpayer to
change his method of accounting with respect to such prepaid interest in order to
allocate it over the taxable years involved.
Id. 66
The presumption of material distortion permitted the
Commissioner, through the power
granted him by Code § 446(b), to require the accrual of the interest over the term of the loan.
I.R.C. § 446(b) (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983). For arguments against Rev. Rul. 68-643, see
Gabinet, supra note 5, at 472-76. For arguments in favor of the revenue ruling, see Asimow,
supra note 33, at 50-57.
67 Rev. Rul. 68-643, supra note 65. Factors considered in determining whether income was
materially distorted included the taxpayer's income in the current and previous taxable years, the
amount of prepaid interest, the time of payment, the reason for prepayment, and the existence of
varying rates of interest over the term of the loan.
6- 62 T.C. 469 (1974), affd, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).
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methods to reflect income clearly, and thus the authority to issue
Revenue Ruling 68-643.69 The court also held that the facts in Sandor
justified the conclusion that the deduction of interest prepaid for more
than twelve months after the end of the tax year resulted in material
distortion of income.70 While other courts have reached the same
result, 7 ' the Tax Court has stated repeatedly that these results do not
constitute judicial approval of the Revenue Ruling per se.7 2 The Sandor court specifically suggested that, since the Ruling was advisory
only and not binding on the court, the Service might be required to
prove material distortion of income, rather than relying on the presumption stated in the Ruling, even in cases involving prepaid interest
73
of more than twelve months.

To halt the conflict between the Service and the courts which
resulted in constant litigation over prepaid interest, Congress enacted
section 461(g) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 74 In enacting
section 461(g), Congress apparently concluded that there is no compelling argument for treating cash method taxpayers differently from
accrual method taxpayers for the purpose of prepaid interest deductions.7 5 The lawmakers cited as the impetus for the change the need to
stem abuses of prepaid interest deductions as a tax shelter by cash
method taxpayers, especially those in high tax brackets. 76 Congress
also saw a need to decrease prepaid interest litigation and to make
deductibility more predictable than it could be when decided in a case
by case fashion.7 7
61 Id. at 479. "[T]here is no reason to doubt . . . the right of the Commissioner to disallow a
deduction for prepaid interest on the basis that it did not clearly reflect income." Id. In addition,
the Sandor court traced the case law development supporting the Commissioner's § 446(b)
discretion. Id. at 476-77.
70 Id. at 481.

71See, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1978); Resnik v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 74 (1976), aft'd, 555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977); Burck v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.
556 (1975), afJ'd, 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976); Cole v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1091 (1975),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979).
71 Sandor, 62 T.C. at 481-82; Cole v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1091, 1104 (1975).
" Sandor, 62 T.C. at 481-82.
71 Tax Reform Act, 26 U.S.C. § 461 (1976); see supra note 1 for text of Code § 461(g).
71 S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONe. & An.
NEws 3439. The committee report notes that simplicity and avoidance of complex records are the
primary benefits of the cash method, but that requiring use of the accrual method in prepaid
interest transactions does not create undue complications since the loan agreement itself constitutes a sufficient record to allow for accurate allocation of prepaid interest.
7I Id. at 3538.
IId. at 3539. The Senate report notes that:
[A] deduction of prepaid interest by the same taxpayer might be allowed in one year
and perhaps not in another year. Also, prepaid interest might be deductible by one
taxpayer who has a large amount of income in a given year after the deduction (so
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The Zidanic court did not consider the deductibility of the interest prepayment itself, but only whether the interest deduction should
be taken when paid, or prorated over the term of the loan. 78 The
79
parties agreed that the $92,375 paid by Zidanic represented interest,
and that no additional interest was due during the first year of the
loan.80 Although no part of this interest payment would have been
8
refunded if the loan principal had been paid before it was due ,
Judge Sterrett noted that the interest payment was computed on the
basis of a full year and held that it must be allocated over that
82
period.
The court reviewed the congressional intent underlying section
461(g), and determined that the purpose of that section was "to
prevent cash basis taxpayers from deferring taxes on their other
sources of income by prepaying interest. "' 83 The court noted that
permitting a taxpayer to escape the effects of section 461(g) merely by
designating the prepaid interest as nonrefundable would undermine
that purpose, and so held that Zidanic could not deduct the full
4
amount of the interest in the year in which it was paid.
Zidanic illustrates the Tax Court's intent to strictly interpret
section 461(g) when considering attempts by high income taxpayers to
use prepaid interest deductions as a tax shelter. While prepaid interest

that the deduction arguably does not -distort" his income) but possibly not be
deductible by another taxpayer who has little or no taxable income after taking the
deduction.
Id.
Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 652.
19 Id. at 654. Interest prepayments also have been characterized as down payments, options,
or, if refundable, as deposits. See Kanter, supra note 5, at 804-08.
80 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 654-55.
11 Id. at 653. One commentator has suggested that refundability of a prepaid interest
payment might be critical to a finding that it is not deductible. See Asimow, supra note 33, at 72:
see also Lewis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 625 (1975) (refundable portion of prepaid interest not
deductible).
82 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 655. Zidanic's interest payment was made for the 12 month period
from Oct. 15, 1977 to Oct. 15, 1978. The court found that only the interest allocable to the
period from Oct. 15 through Dec. 31, 1977 was deductible in tax year 1977, and that the balance
could be deducted only in the following tax year. Id.
83 Id. In so finding, the court relied on part of the legislative history which stated that
"Congress believed that the creation of a tax shelter with prepaid interest could not be justified
even under the cash method of accounting." JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 97 [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMM.
EXPLANATION].
The committee also noted that "prepaid interest has been extensively used in
many types of tax shelters to defer tax on income which would otherwise be taxable in higher
marginal tax brackets." Id. at 98; see also Berger, supra note 4, at 237 n. 142 and accompanying
text.
81 Zidanic, 79 T.C. at 655.
78
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transactions serve to minimize a buyer's cash outlay and risk of financial loss, 85 they have been especially effective in balancing an income
that varies widely from year to year. 6 For example, a taxpayer could
use a prepaid interest deduction during a year in which his income
was unusually high, and include as income a prepayment refund
during a year in which his income was significantly lower, thus
minimizing the tax disadvantages of such fluctuations.8 7 Even if the
prepaid interest is not refundable, taking the prepaid interest deduction in one tax year and including the income or appreciation from an
asset in a different tax year benefits a taxpayer whose income fluctuates widely. The Zidanic court's strict interpretation of section 461(g)
as requiring the accrual of prepaid interest payments effectively eliminates the tax benefits of these transactions.81
Section 461(g) does not, however, extend to postpaid interest.8 9
Taxpayers could thus create a tax shelter by paying interest in a year
later than that to which it is properly allocable. Although it is possible
to do some balancing of income between tax years by postpaying
interest,9" it seems that taxpayers usually prefer a current deduction to
a deferred one. In addition, lenders may be reluctant to defer receipt
of the payment. If postpaid interest becomes a problem, the Service
could use section 446 to require a change in accounting methods for

85 See Asimow, supra note 33, at 39 (chart comparing cash flow for conventional financing
and prepaid interest financing; prepaid interest financing requires less out of pocket expenditures
by taxpayer throughout entire investment period).
8 Id. at 40. Any attempted use of prepaid interest transactions is subject to thorough
scrutiny, however, especially concerning whether there is bona fide indebtedness and whether
the transaction had any purpose other than tax avoidance. See, e.g.. Ippolito, 364 F.2d at 746;
Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 740.
87 The use of prepaid interest transactions to balance widely fluctuating yearly incomes was
especially advantageous prior to 1982, when the taxpayer in the highest tax bracket was taxed at
a rate of 70%, rather than the current rate of 50%. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 1978 & Cur. Supp.
1983) (as amended by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 101).
88 See Berger, supra note 4, at 236 (example of prepaid interest transaction in partnership
context). Another commentator has noted that "there is usually no business purpose for making a
prepayment of interest rather than a down payment of principal." Asimow, supra note 33, at 72
n.173.
89 See supra note 1 for text of Code § 461(g).
90 For example, the taxpayer can increase the promissory note by the amount of principal
due plus the accrued interest liability in order to postpone the deduction until a later tax year.
Merely increasing the primary debt obligation is not considered '*payment" by a cash basis
taxpayer. Thomason v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 576 (1935). This strategy might be used when
a taxpayer has more deductions than income in a given year. See also Kanter, supra note 5, at
798-800.
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that particular item."' As an alternative, Congress could amend section 461(g) to include postpaid interest.
Another way to circumvent the effects of section 461(g) might be
to use the statutory exception it creates for the deduction of "points"
paid in the purchase of the taxpayer's residence. 9 This, however,
affords little opportunity for use as a tax shelter,9 3 since the exception
is carefully limited by requiring (1) that the granting of points be an
established business practice in the area where the residence is purchased; (2) that the number of points be limited to those generally
charged in that area; and (3) that the indebtedness be secured by the
taxpayer's principal residence. 94 "Principal residence" implies one per
95
taxpayer, and thus the possibility for abuse is extremely limited.
The absolute ban of section 461(g) on the current deduction of
prepaid interest by a cash basis taxpayer will thus almost certainly be
effective in eliminating the use of prepaid interest as a tax shelter. In
many prepaid interest transactions the "interest" expense is not really
interest, and therefore is not properly a section 163(a) interest deduction. 96 The courts have recognized this and have suggested that such
prepayments could be seen as deposits,9 7 down payments, 98 options,9 9

'I See supra note 12 for text of Code § 446; see also Asimow, supra note 33, at 58 (describing
Commissioner's use of § 446 power to alter accounting method for prepaid interest).

11

See JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 83, at 102 ("Points are additional interest

charges which are usually paid when a loan is closed and which are generally imposed by the
lender in lieu of a higher interest rate.").
91 See Code § 461(g)(2), supra note 1 (allowing current deduction of points subject to certain
conditions). Note, however, that points also can be a substitute for financing fees, commitment
fees, or service fees, and as such may not be deductible as interest. See generally The Deductibility of Commitment Fees, Financing Fees and Points, 31 TAX LAW. 888 (1978) (discussing factors
influencing deductibility as interest of these fees incurred in securing loan).
"' See Code § 461(g)(2), supra note 1. The legislative history explains the rationale behind the
enactment of subsection (2) as follows:
Where points are paid as compensation for the use of borrowed money (and thus
qualify as interest for tax purposes) rather than as payment for the lender's services,
the points are substituted for a higher stated annual interest rate. As such, points are
similar to a prepayment of interest and under the Act are generally to be treated as
paid over the term of the loan.
JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 83, at 102.
95 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1981) for a discussion of the factors used to determine the
location of a taxpayer's principal residence.
" For example, if a loan is for $1000 at 10% interest, with the principal payable at the end
of a 10 year term, and the borrower prepays the interest, in essence the loan is for $900 at slightly
more than 10% interest, and all the interest will be paid at the end as part of the "principal."
" See La Croix v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 471, 480 (1974).
s Id.
o See Lawler v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1935).
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or discounted loans. 0 0 Since section 461(g) prevents the current deduction of prepaid interest, the incentive for characterizing deposits,
down payments, and other financial arrangements as interest is minimized. This should significantly decrease litigation in this area.
One commentator suggests that Congress enacted section 4 6 1(g)
in response to an emerging disagreement between the Service and the
Tax Court concerning the interpretation of Revenue Ruling 68-643. '0'
If so, section 461(g) goes further than did either the Revenue Ruling or
the Tax Court decisions in restricting prepaid interest deductions. It
not only closes tax loopholes, but also hinders cash basis taxpayers who
are legitimately attempting to match income with expenses incurred
in earning that income.
A cash basis taxpayer who, for example, negotiates a loan for a
ten year period might invest the money with the expectation that the
benefits also will accrue over that period. If, instead, he receives an
unexpectedly high income from that investment midway through the
loan period, he may want to deduct some of the cost of producing that
income by prepaying interest. 102 Under these circumstances, allowing
a deduction of the prepaid interest would give the taxpayer the flexibility to make sound business decisions without being penalized for
using the cash method of accounting. A cash basis taxpayer is also
penalized when prepaid interest is used primarily to secure more
favorable loan terms, as was done by the taxpayer in Fackler,10

3

or

when he regularly prepays interest in advance as part of periodic loan
payments.
A law that absolutely requires the accrual of prepaid interest by a
cash basis taxpayer may decrease litigation and limit tax shelters, but
it also seems implicitly to deny the validity of cash basis accounting for
all but the most unsophisticated taxpayer. If this is the view of Congress, then section 446 should be changed to reflect that understanding. If not, then section 461(g) should permit a prepaid interest deduction in routine business transactions made for bona fide business
purposes and possibly in nonbusiness transactions where the deduction
is de minimis, and the prepayment is not for the purpose of sheltering
income.
00 See Bartolme v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 821 (1974).
...See Berger, supra note 4. at 237.
Growing client-based service businesses such as law firms and advertising agencies may
C01
find themselves receiving unexpectedly large income from their investment early in the loan
period. Although the taxpayer could use the funds to pay off the loan, he might prefer to reinvest
the money in his business by retaining the loan, since it is probably at a more favorable interest
rate than he could presently secure.
03 See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
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To discourage improper use of the deduction, a formula could be
used which allows for only partial current deduction depending on the
length of time covered by the prepayment. For example, the loan
term could be divided into tenths. A payment due in the final tenth,
but made in the preceding tenth, would be ninety-six percent currently deductible with the other four percent accrued over the remaining life of the loan. If the same interest was prepaid in the eighth of
the ten loan periods it would be ninety-two percent currently deductible; if made in the seventh loan period it would be eighty-eight
percent currently deductible, and so forth. The extreme would be
tenth period interest prepaid in the first period; that would be sixtyfour percent currently deductible, with the remaining thirty-six percent accrued over the balance of the loan period. Naturally, any
interest paid when due would be one hundred percent deductible if
not restricted by other Code sections.
Allowing the current deduction of a portion of prepaid interest,
when used to offset income produced specifically with the borrowed
funds, would leave some latitude for sound business planning, while
still curtailing use of the deduction as a tax shelter. In the formula
outlined above, the further in advance a prepayment of interest was
made, the smaller the portion of the prepayment that would be
currently deductible. This relationship would discourage abuse of the
deduction since prepayment of interest well in advance of its due date
would, like section 461(g), have the effect of allocating the prepaid
interest over the remaining life of the loan. The desired matching of
income with expenses incurred in producing that income is encouraged by requiring that the income being offset by the deduction be
income produced by the use of the borrowed funds on which the
04
interest was prepaid. 1
While it is clear that the prepaid interest deduction was being
exploited by taxpayers to shelter income, 105 it also was being used in
routine business transactions with legitimate business purposes. 106 The
rigid elimination of the use of prepaid interest deductions by cash
basis taxpayers, mandated by section 461(g), coupled with the strict
interpretation of that statute by the Tax Court in Zidanic, restricts not
only the abuse of the deduction but also its legitimate business use. A
formula such as the one discussed above, which allows a partial

104See supra notes 11-13, 15-17 and accompanying text.
'0' See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
'1' See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
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current deduction of prepaid interest expenses on borrowed funds
when used to offset income produced specifically by those funds allows the taxpayer some latitude in matching income with the cost of
producing that income. Were such a formula employed, cash basis
accounting would remain a valid option for the business taxpayer.
Marian L. Cannell

